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BRIEF RE: JURISDICTION 
 




In this Supplemental Brief, Appellee Mary Ellen Robertson (“Appellee”) responds 
to the Court’s question of whether a district court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or 
expand a stipulated, non-child-related non-disparagement clause contained in a final 
decree of divorce.  For the reasons set forth below, Appellee submits that a district court 
does not have such continuing jurisdiction.   
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ARGUMENT 
I. NO JURISDICTION EXISTS TO MODIFY THE NON-DISPARAGEMENT 
 CLAUSE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN A CLASS OF ISSUES 
 FOR WHICH CONTINUING JURISDICTION IS AVAILABLE. 
 
Article VIII of the Utah Constitution creates and enumerates the powers of Utah’s 
state courts and the scope of their jurisdiction.  Article VIII, Section 1 creates, “a trial 
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court.”  Article VIII, Section 5 defines 
the scope of the district court’s original and appellate jurisdiction.  The concept of 
continuing jurisdiction is not specifically addressed in Article VIII.   
 While divorce cases certainly fall within the original jurisdiction of the district 
courts, principles of res judicata apply to judgments in such cases as any other.  See 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (“The doctrine 
of res judicata applies in divorce actions.”); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-7 (defining when 
decree becomes “absolute”).1  Thus, as in any case, escape from res judicata for the 
modification of a final judgment requires a legal basis—whether constitutional, statutory 
or judicially-recognized.    
In divorce matters, the legislature has opened certain limited doors for 
modification of final judgments—essentially, matters that directly relate to the parties’ 
status as husband, wife, father or mother.  See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3).  
Importantly, the legislature has not granted an unlimited jurisdictional scope that allows 
for modification of any matter contained in a final judgment.  In this regard, the various 
 
1  Appellee refers to and incorporates by reference, but for the sake of brevity will not restate, the 
detailed authority set forth in the Court’s Supplemental Order Briefing.   
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change-in-circumstances standards for modification of these final judgments apply only 
to the portions of those judgments to which limited continuing jurisdiction has been 
granted to address.  The issue presented in this appeal does not fall within the scope of 
the district court’s continuing jurisdiction. 
Finally, Appellee’s research uncovered no case allowing modification of an order 
outside of the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3).  Under the laws of other 
jurisdictions, continuing jurisdiction is similarly limited absent a specific reservation of 
jurisdiction contained in the decree itself.  See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 603 P.2d 650, 652 
(Kan. 1979) (“As a general rule, a court has no continuing jurisdiction or power of 
modification over a division of property after entering an original divorce decree.”);2 
Anderson v. Anderson, 468 N.E.2d 784, 787 (Ohio App. Dist. 2 1984) (“[Ohio law] does 
not confer jurisdiction upon a court of common pleas to modify periodic alimony 
payments provided for in a separation agreement incorporated in a decree of dissolution 




2  In an opposite statement of continuing jurisdiction, Kansas law specifically disclaims all 
continuing jurisdiction besides custody and child support, as opposed to Utah’s silence on collateral 
matters.  See K.S.A. § 23-2712(b) (“Matters settled by an agreement incorporated in the decree, other 
than matters pertaining to the legal custody, residency, visitation, parenting time, support or education of 
the minor children, shall not be subject to subsequent modification by the court except: (1) As prescribed 
by the agreement; or (2) as subsequently consented to by the parties.”). 
 
3  Similar to Utah law, Ohio law is silent on modification of collateral issues beyond custody, 
support and property division.  See O.R.C. § 3105.65(B) (outlining ways a court may modify custody, 




II. DOMESTIC LITIGANTS—BUT NOT APPELLANT—MAY STILL 
 OBTAIN RELIEF UNDER RULE 60 IN APPROPRIATE 
 CIRCUMSTANCES. 
 
Absent another basis for modification of a final judgment, divorce litigants are left 
with the same tools as any other civil litigant—those set forth in Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60.4  Under Rule 60(a), clerical errors may be corrected, and under Rules 60(b) 
and (d), relief from an order may be obtained.  In divorce cases, the most likely basis for 
such relief could be Rule 60(b)(5), which would allow a party to be relieved from a 
judgment where “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application.”  However, neither Rule 60(b)(5), nor any other portion or Rule 60, grants 
the district courts power to enter new orders like the order that was requested by 
Appellant in this case.  Should a party desire a new order against his or her ex-spouse not 
within the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) or some other applicable law granting 
continuing jurisdiction, he or she may do so by filing a new action and as provided by the 
laws applying to ordinary, unrelated parties; he or she may not use the divorce case as a 
vehicle to police post-divorce conduct not directly related to the parties’ status as 
husband, wife, father or mother.5  The decree of divorce severed the special relationship 
these parties had.               
 
4  Appellant never filed a Rule 60 motion, so this brief analysis of Rule 60 is primarily an academic 
exercise.   
 
5  This rationale is precisely what Appellee has argued to this Court and to the district court 
regarding speech issues.  Appellant could, and did, file a separate defamation action against Appellee, just 
as he could any other person he claimed was publishing false statements about him.  The divorce case is 
not the proper vehicle to enter new orders on matters that do not directly relate to the parties’ status as 
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REQUESTED RESULT 
  This Court should find that a district court lacks continuing jurisdiction to modify 
provisions of a divorce decree except as within the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3).  
Should a party in a divorce proceeding require relief from an onerous provision in a 
divorce decree not within the scope of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3), Rule 60(a), (b) or (d) 
could allow for such relief depending on the circumstances of that case.  But because 
Rule 60 does not allow for entry of new orders, Rule 60 does not provide a jurisdictional 
basis for the relief requested by Appellant in this case.    
Dated this 21st day of October, 2019. 
 LIEBERMAN SIEBERS, LLC, 
 
By:  
 [Electronically Signed]                                                    
 Ben W. Lieberman 
 
Attorney for Appellee 
 
 
husband, wife, father or mother.     
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